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Voigt: Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act

COMMENTS
WYOMING'S ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
REVIEW ACT
The increasing practice of legislative delegation of
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies has, in
turn, heightened interest in the concept of legislative oversight.' The Wyoming State Legislature joined this trend in
1977, with the passage of the Administrative Regulation
Review Act (ARRA).2 The ARRA provides for administrative agency 3 accountability within a framework of
legislative and executive review. Unfortunately, the Act was
poorly drafted, leaving substantial questions as to its
operative effect. Further, the constitutionality of some of the
Act's basic features is uncertain. The purposes of this Comment are to analyze the review process established by the
ARRA, and to address the constitutional issues involved.
THE REVIEW PROCESS

Under Wyoming's Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), rulemaking has been a relatively unilateral agency
function.4 Specified statutory requirements had to be met, of
course, and judicial review was available, but the delegated
authority was largely unsupervised. The ARRA now greatly
limits this agency freedom to promulgate rules, and an
amendment to the APA also prescribes new filing proCopyright©61979 by the University of Wyoming
1. Note. Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The Probable Response to a
Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285 (1976) [hereinafter Note. Congressional Vetol: Watson. Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl of the
Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983 (1975) [hereinafter Watson; Cooper & Cooper. The
Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467 (1962) [hereinafter Cooper & Cooper]; Schwartz. Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and
Regulations: I The American Experience, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1031 (1955) [hereinafter
Schwartz]; Ginnane. The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953) [hereinafter Ginnane].
2. WYo. STAT. §§ 28-9-101 to 28-9-108 (1977).
3. Section 101(a)(i) defines "agency" as "any authority, bureau, board, commission,
department, division, officer or employee of the state, excluding the state legislature
and the judiciary." Wyo. STAT. § 28-9-101 (a)(i) (1977 ). This definition differs from the
definition of "agency" found in the Administrative Procedure Act, which includes
county or municipal governments. WYo. STAT. § 9-4-1011a)(i) (1977). The legislature
obviously intended that only state level agencies be subject to the ARRA. This intention is further reflected in a special definition of "agency" found in another section of the Administrative Procedure Act, which limits certain other filing requirements to state level agencies. WYo. STAT. § 9-4-103(d1iii) (1977). The ARRA
does, though, apply to rules just as they are defined in the Administrative Procedure Act. Wyo. STAT. § 28-9-101(a)(iii) (1977).
4. WYo. STAT. §§ 9-4-103 and 9-4-104 (1977).
5. WYO. STAT. § 9-4-114 (1977).
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cedures for agency orders and decisions., Under the ARRA,
the Legislative Service Office (LSO), the Management Council of the legislature (Council), and the legislature itself each
aphas a role in reviewing rules.7 In addition, the governor's
8
effective.
becomes
rule
any
before
necessary
is
proval
The ARRA has placed most of the initial review responsibility on LSO, the research arm of the legislature.9 Section
103(a) of the Act provides that a copy of all rules being implemented by agencies exercising rulemaking authority be
submitted to LSO within sixty days of the effective date of
the Act.'" Further,. prior to the adoption, amendment, or
repeal of a rule "authorized or required by law," each agency
must submit a draft of the proposed rule to LSO for review. 1 '
An amendment to the APA also requires the agency to give
LSO twenty days' notice of intended substantive rulemaking. 1 The key provision of the ARRA is Section 108, which
says "no rule may be adopted, amended, repealed, implemented or enforced" unless it is subjected to the review
process, beginning with filing with LSO. 13 LSO then has sixty days in which to review the rule, and report its findings to
the Council. I4
The Council is not unlike a legislative board of directors,
composed as it is of the leadership from both houses and
both major political parties. 15 The ARRA gives the Council
authority not only to review rules upon report from LSO, but
to examine the rules and regulations of any agency, demand
6.

WYO. STAT. § 9-4-102(b) (1977).

7.
8.

These roles will be analyzed in particular in the course of this Comment.
The governor actually takes part in the review process at several stages, as will be
explained infra.
LSO is created, and its duties are defined in WYO. STAT. §§ 28-8-101 to 28-8-112
(1977).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-103(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-103(b) (1977). Subsection (c) of the same section specifies that
drafts of any rules "required by law" must be submitted for review within ninety
days of the effective date of the Act requiring such rules. It appears from the context that "submitted" means "submitted to LSO," even though the Council, rather
than LSO, is given authority to extend the date for submission. Wyo. STAT. §
28-9-103(c) (1977). The specific wording of Subsection (c), and ordinary usage, suggests that "required by law" means required by statutory law. See, Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 488 F.2d 1101, 1105 (3d Cir. 1974); City
of Mountlake Terrace v. Stone, 492 P.2d 226, 230 (Wash. App. 1971); Gilliam v.
California Employment Stabilization Comm., 278 P.2d 528, 536 (Cal. App. 1955).
Regulations proposed under discretionary authority, or to meet common law requirements are not subject to this special provision.
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-1031a)(i) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-108 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-104(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 28-8-102 (1977).

9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/6

2

Voigt: Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act

1979

COMMENTS

agency cooperation, hold public hearings, and review rules
upon a legislator's or legislative committee's demand.1 6
Standards for Council review are set out in two separate sections of the ARRA. Section 102(a)(1) states that the Council
may examine agency rules "to determine if they properly implement legislative intent, are within the scope of delegated
authority, and are lawfully adopted.'

17

Section 104(c) defines

the specific determinations to be made by the Council:
(c) When reviewing a rule of an agency, the
council shall determine whether the rule:
(i) Appears to be within the intent and
scope of the legislative enactment delegating
the authority to adopt the rule;
(ii) Has been adopted in accordance with
all applicable and statutory requirements of
law; and
(iii) Meets all constitutional and
statutory requirements, restrictions and standards.'1
The reasons for the inclusion in the ARRA of two
separate sections containing review standards for the Council is not entirely clear. The language of Section 102(a)(1) is
evidently meant as a general grant of authority to review,
while Section 104(c) mandates the standards that all rules
must meet.
Once it reaches its conclusions, the Council may prepare
written findings, which may then be sent to any interested
legislator or legislative committee, the agency concerned, or
LSO.' 9 But more important to the central review process, the
Council is obligated to submit its approval of the rule or its
recommendations for change to the governor within thirty
days of receiving an LSO report.20 Finally, the Council must
report all of its findings, recommendations and actions to the
legislature at its next succeeding session.2
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-102 ana 28-9-104 11977).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-102(a)(i) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-104(c) (1977). It appears that a word has been omitted following
"applicable" in Subsection (ii). The context suggests that "constitutional" might
have been intended.
19. WYo. STAT. § 28-9-105 (1977).
20. WYO.STAT. § 28-9-106(a) (1977).
21. WYO. STAT. § 28-9-107(a (1977).

16.
17.
18.
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The role of the governor in the review process is less
than clear on the face of the ARRA. He has input in at least
two, and probably three stages." Newly added Section
103(d) of the APA states that no rule may be filed with the
secretary of state until it has been approved and signed by
the governor.2 3 At this stage, the governor must determine
whether the rule is within the agency's scope of authority,
whether it meets the legislative purpose of that statutory
authority, and whether it has met procedural requirements
for adoption."4 Since this executive review power is in a new
section of the APA, rather than in a section of the ARRA, it
is evidently meant to be part of the initial rulemaking process. Consequently, when an agency adopts a final version of
a new rule, the rule is sent to the governor for his signature;
if he indicates his approval by signing the rule, it can then be
filed with the secretary of state, at which time it becomes effective.ss
Quite clearly, no rule may be adopted unless the goverhas
approved it during this initial stage. This is an effecnor
tive veto power in the hands of the governor. Unfortunately,
the APA amendments failed to provide specific procedures
to be followed by the agency in the event the governor disapproves a rule. Seemingly, the agency would be free to adopt
any recommendations the governor might suggest, and
redraft the rule. Such changes would then have to be
reported to LSO, so that its review would be meaningful.
Furthermore, problems could arise as to the notice and hearing requirements of the APA if these changes went outside
the original scope of the proposed rule.
The second stage of the governor's review authority occurs after LSO and the Council have reviewed the rule, and
the Council has submitted its recommendations. The governor then has fifteen days in which to either order amendment
or rescission of the rule in accordance with Council recommendations, or to file his objections to the Council's recom22.
23.
24.
25.

The constitutional implications of the governor's role in the review process will be
discussed later in this Comment.
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-1031d) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-104(b) (1977). Provided. of course, that it has been filed with LSO
pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 28-9-103(b) (1977). Before Section 9-4-104(b) was amended.
rules became effective twenty days after filing with the secretary of state.
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mendations.2 6 The governor's rulemaking authority at this
stage is also direct and powerful-he may order the amendment or rescission of a rule that he has already declared to be
prima facie valid."7
Before looking at the governor's third review function,
it is necessary to describe the role of the legislature, itself, in
the process. Pursuant to Section 104(b) of the ARRA, any
member of the legislature, or any legislative committee may
request the Council to review any agency rule.2" Under Section 105, the Council is authorized to report to various
legislative committees, or to legislators.2 9 The legislature, as
a body, does not become involved in the review process until
LSO, the Council, and the governor have performed their
respective functions, as described above. Section 107 sets
out the substantive provisions for legislative oversight:
(a) The council shall report all its findings,
recommendations and actions to the legislature at
its next succeeding session following the review.
The report shall include:
(i)

A copy of the rule reviewed;

(ii) The determinations of the legislative
service office;
(iii) The recommendations of the council
made to the governor and the agency;
(iv) Any objections filed by the governor
with respect to council recommendations to
amend or rescind administrative rules; and
(v) Any recommendations for legislative
action.
(b) The legislature, each house voting
separately, shall vote on the council's recommendations with respect to prohibiting the implementation or enforcement of any rule during the session in
which the recommendations are made. Each house
shall schedule council reports for action in accordance with its rules.
26.
27.
28.
29.

WYo. STAT. § 28-9-106(b) (1977).
Pursuant to WYo. STAT. § 9-4-1031d) (1977). the governor has previously determined
that the rule meets statutory requirements and that it is within the purpose of the
enabling legislation.
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-104(b) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-105 (1977).
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(c) If the legislature approves by legislative
order a council recommendation to prohibit the implementation or enforcement of any rule, the rule
shall not be implemented or enforced. If the
legislature fails to approve a council recommendation with respect to prohibiting the implementation
or enforcement of a rule, the rule may be implemented or enforced, as the case may be, after compliance
with all other applicable provisions of law."0
Section 107 is important for several reasons. First, Subsection (a) requires the Council to make its report at the
legislature's next succeeding session. Additionally, Subsection (b) requires the legislature to vote on these recommendations during the session in which they are made. If the
legislature fails to pass, or to vote upon the recommendations during that session, the rule stands. There is no indication in the Act that similar recommendations may be
brought up at later legislative sessions.
The second major point in Section 107 is that the
language of both Subsections (b) and (c), plus the fact that
the rule involved is already effective, suggests that when the
legislature votes, the form of the question is whether to prohibit the operation of a rule, not whether to allow it. In other
words, if the opponents of the rule cannot muster a majority
vote, the rule stands. This is not a case of needing a majority
vote to make the rule effective; it takes a majority vote of
both houses to suspend the effectiveness of the rule. 1 Clearly, the legislature's direct power over administrative agency
regulations is not as potent as that of the governor.
The final, and most controversial aspect of Section 107
of the ARRA, which involves the third stage of the
governor's review, is the form of the legislative vote. Subsection (c) provides for a vote on the Council's recommendations
to be in the form of a "legislative order." 2 And Subsection
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-107 (1977). The language of Subsections (b) and 1c as to "prohibiting implementation" reflects one of the internal inconsistencies of the ARRA
and related sections of the APA. As was pointed out, the rule is already effective by
this stage in the review process. The vote of the legislature here would actually be
more like a repeal than a prohibition against implementation.
31. Consequently, this does not involve the controversial "one-house veto." See,
Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Atkins v. United States. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. CL.
1977). See also, the sources cited supra note 1. The "each house voting separately"
language of Section 107(b) does not negate the fact that it is the legislature that
shall vote,
32. WYo. STAT. § 28-9-107(c) (1977).
30.
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(b) clearly provides that, although each house votes separately, it is the legislature that is voting on the order. 3 Since
both houses must vote on the order, their concurrence is
necessary for its passage, and the order must then be sent to
the governor, 4 giving him a third review of the questioned
regulation. 5
CONSTITUTIONALITY

There are three principal constitutional questions presented by the provisions of the ARRA:
1. Does the Act violate the principle of separation
of powers by infringing on the executive?
2. Does the Act violate the principle of separation
of powers by infringing on the judiciary?
3. Does the Act violate constitutional lawmaking
rocedures by providing for legislative action to
e in the form of an "order", and by failing to
provide for a final gubernatorial veto of that
order?
Separation of Powers- The Executive
At least since the writing of the United States Constitution, this country has feared the spectre of unilateral governmental power. The separation of powers doctrine, though not
expressly defined, is implied in the federal Constitution.3 6
Wyoming, like many other states, specifically recognized the
principle in its own constitution. Further, the courts of
Wyoming have continued to hold that the three branches of
government should be kept separate and distinct.3 8
The problem of separation of powers arises in the
legislative oversight context in the attempt to define the administrative rulemaking process as either "executive" or
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-107(b) (1977).
WYo. CONST. art. III, § 41.
This simplified conclusion is based on part of the constitutional analysis appearing
in this Comment.
36. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1928).
37. "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution expressly directed or permitted." WYo. CONST. art. II. § 1.
38. Carter v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Laramie, 518 P.2d 142.
144 (Wyo. 1974): State ex reL Henderson v. Burdick, 4 Wyo. 272. 33 P. 125, 131
(1893).

33.
34.

35.
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"legislative" in nature. Rulemaking, when viewed as
lawmaking, appears to be a traditional legislative function.
But when viewed as the operational implementation of
statutory provisions, it takes on the character of an executive duty. Holders of this latter view would see an unconstitutional infringement upon executive authority in any
attempt by the legislature to dictate regulations.3 9 The fundamental precept of the separation of powers doctrine is,
after all, that the maker of the law should not also enforce
it.40

Proponents of legislative oversight offer four basic
arguments to refute the charge of a separation of powers
violation. First, while the doctrine is firmly imbedded in
American Constitutional rhetoric, many courts and commentators today seriously question its practical utility.4" The
emphasis in modern government is on the sharing of functions, aptly exemplified by the administrative agency. Second, no sharp and logical lines can be drawn between executive and legislative functions, and aside from a few
specific delegations, no such distinctions have been constitutionally spelled out.4 2 Thus, there is no substance to the complaint of interference by the legislature with "naturally" executive functions. Third, the powers of the executive department are limited to those specifically granted in the constitution, while the powers of the legislative department are absolute, except as restricted and limited by the Constitution."
In other words, since administrative rulemaking is not constitutionally mandated as an executive function, the
legislative branch should have all doubts in this area resolved in its favor. And fourth, legislative approval by failure to
adopt a resolution of disapproval can be seen as a contingency upon which the agency's rulemaking authority can be
made to depend.44 Annulment by order or resolution is a
mere safeguard, a check on a subordinate legislative power.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Watson, at 1087.
Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 31, at 138-139.
Atkins v. United States, supra note 31, at 1066: SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §
64 (1976): Cooper & Cooper, at 479-487, 502-507. The argument is that the complexity of government has destroyed the feasibility of "pure" separation, resulting in a
"blending of powers." 16 AM. Jua.2d ConstitutionalLaw § 214 (1964).
Ginnane, at 571: Cooper & Cooper, at 480: Atkins v. United States, supra note 31. at
1066.
People ex rel Richardson v. Henderson, 4 Wyo. 535, 35 P. 517. 520 (1894): 16 AM.
JuR.2d ConstitutionalLaw § 216 (1964).
Schwartz, at 1043.
Id at 1043.
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One commentator suggests that where an act contains such
a condition, future use of the legislative veto is not even
in the act, and
lawmaking, since it was contemplated
46
therefore evinces no change in policy.

The courts have understandably avoided a frontal
assault on this systemic constitutional issue. Over the years,
however, the question has often been addressed, at least in
passing, in cases that conveniently could be decided on other
grounds. In 1902, the United States Supreme Court in
Dreyer v. Illinois, while concluding that the immediate question was one for state determination, suggested that the true
meaning of the separation of powers doctrine is that the
whole power of one department should not be exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department.4 " The same Court came close to deciding the
issue in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., where the legislative veto
was praised.4 8 But Sibbach was only superficially similar to

the instant situation, because it dealt with the constitutionality of Congress delegating procedural rulemaking
authority to federal courts.
The most recent Supreme Court case concerning the
separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches was Buckley v. Valeo, a 1976 case. 9 In a very
lengthy and complex opinion, the Court in Buckley declared
several features of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 unconstitutional. Because it was able to invalidate the
Act based on its conclusion that the makeup of a Federal
Election Commission violated the appointment clause of the
United States Constitution, the Court was able to sidestep
the issue of the legislative veto that was also involved. 50 At
the same time, though, the Court made several comments indicating its belief that the separation of powers doctrine is a
fundamental principle of American government." Indeed,
one commentator has concluded that the "philosophical
premises and principles of construction necessary to the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Cooper & Cooper, at 476.
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71. 84 11902).
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1. 14-15 1941): Note, Congressional Veto, at
290-291.
Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id at 140 n.176.
Id.at 120.
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Buckley decision are strong evidence of a strict view of the
doctrine of separation of powers.""
Despite such views, the weight of authority today appears to reject the contention that legislative oversight
violates the separation of powers doctrine." The attorney
general of Wyoming, in his initial appraisal of the ARRA,
suggested that a separation of powers argument alone probably was not sufficient to invalidate the Act.54 In view of
the present state of the law, and the current low status of the
separation of powers doctrine, it is probably safe to assume
that the ARRA could survive a constitutional challenge based on that doctrine.
Separaton of Powers-The Judiciary

Wyoming's constitutional recognition of the separation
of powers doctrine applies to judicial as well as legislative
functions.5 5 Consequently, neither the legislature nor the
governor may perform judicial tasks in derogation of the
judicial power of the courts. What this means in practical application is difficult to determine. In the normal course of
lawmaking, both non-judicial branches necessarily address
questions of constitutionality and legislative intent, traditionally judicial functions.56 The final say, of course, still
rests with the courts.6 7 But the fact remains that the blending of powers necessary in the administrative agency context applies with equal force to judicial functions.
As explained above, Sections 102(a)(i) and 104(c) of the
ARRA provide specific guidelines for the Council's review of
administrative regulations.5 On their face, these guidelines
appear to be a blatant infringement by the legislative branch
upon the role of the courts. Indeed, both the attorney general
and the governor of Wyoming have so interpreted them. 9
52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Note, Congressional Veto, at 300.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. § 64 (1976).

Letter opinion from V. Frank Mendicino. Attorney General, to Ed Herschler, Gover-

nor of Wyoming. at 5 (March 7. 1977).
WYo. CONST. art. II. § 1,supra note 37.
16 AM. JUR.2d ConstitutionalLaw § 104 (1964).
Id
WYO. STAT. §§ 28-9-1021a)(i) and 28-9-104(c) (1977).
Letter opinion, supra note 54, at 6: letter from Ed Herschler, Governor of Wyoming,
to Honorable L. Donald Northrup. President of the Senate, at 2 (February 25, 1978).
The letter was written by Governor Herschler upon his veto of a legislative order
reviewing an agency regulation.
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Further, it is universally accepted that the duty of determining the constitutionality of laws belongs to the courts, not to
the legislature. 0
Similar arguments can be made in respect to the review
authority granted the governor in Section 103(d) of the
APA,6 ' and Section 106(b) of the ARRA.62 Under the APA
section, the governor assesses statutory authority,
legislative purpose, and procedural requirements. Under the
ARRA, his action is taken on the basis of the Council recommendations made pursuant to the constitutionally questionable guidelines mentioned above. In either case, the
governor appears to be exercising traditionally judicial functions. Having no judicial authority itself, the legislature certainly may not confer such authority on the executive. 3 And
since every law is presumptively constitutional until
declared otherwise by the courts, an officer of the executive
department has no power to make that determination himself.64
To automatically decide that these questioned provisions render the ARRA unconstitutional, however, would be
to ignore the presumption that existing laws are constitutional6 5 and also to ignore the concept of blended powers and
the demands of the separation doctrine in the context of
modern government. The presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes requires that the law not be invalidated if any possible interpretation can sustain it." In
this respect, it is important to note that the courts have interpreted the separation of powers doctrine as requiring not
that the legislative and executive branches refrain from commenting on constitutionality, but that they not prevent the
judiciary from making the final determination. 6' Sections
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

16 AM. Jua.2d ConstitutionalLaw § 101 (1964).
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-103(d) (1977). At this stage, of course, the rule is not yet effective,
and the governor is merely participating in the initial rulemaking process.
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-106(b) (1977).
Tucker v. State, 35 N.E.2d 270, 283-284 (Ind. 1941).
16 AM. Jua.2d ConstitutionalLaw § 104 (1964).
Wyoming accepts the general rule that every law must be presumed to be constitutional, with all reasonable doubts resolved in its favor. State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344,
347 (Wyo. 1974).
In re Owl Creek Irr. Dist.. 71 Wyo. 30, 253 P.2d 867, 879, reh. denied 71 Wyo. 70, 258
P.2d 220 (1953). The Wyoming Supreme Court at one time set the standard for making this determination as "beyond a reasonable doubt." Zancanelli v. Central Coal &
Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 983 (Wyo. 1918).
State v. City of Troutdale, 558 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Or. 1977): City of Tacoma v.
O'Brien. 534 P.2d 114.116-117 (Wash. 1975): Polk v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 6

200

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

102(a)(i) and 104(c) can be interpreted as merely allowing the
Council to make the types of evaluations legislators would
normally make during the proposal of any law. The Council's
recommendations based on the guidelines found in these sections of the ARRA are sent to the legislature," the
governor,"9 the agency,7' 0 and any of various interested
legislators or legislative committees.7 1 In the hands of any of
these parties, the recommendations have no more force than
mere suggestions. If the legislature chooses to act upon
them pursuant to Section 107(b), that body, in effect, will
merely be repealing or amending a legislative enactment. It
is not the prerogative of the judiciary at that point to inquire
into the legislature's reasons for that action, and the fact
that the legislature has addressed itself to questions of constitutionality or legislative intent does not encroach upon
the judicial branch. This legislative action, of course, is effective only prospectively, in that private rights or obligations
that have arisen in the interim are to be ascertained by the
courts.7 2
Under this analysis, the legislative review established
by the ARRA is logically little different from normal procedures in the case of re-evaluation of a statute, which the
legislature certainly has the authority to do. A more serious
problem, however, is engendered by the sweeping powers
granted to the governor in Section 106(b):
(b) The governor, within fifteen (15) days after
receiving any council recommendations, shall either
order that the rule be amended or rescinded in accordance with the council's recommendations or file
with the council in writing, his objections to the
recommendations.73
The fact that the regulation is already effective at this
stage," raises the issue of the possible constitutional infirmity of this gubernatorial function. If the governor can order
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

Control Bd., 420 P.2d 520. 522. 523 tOkla. 1966): State v. Eaton, 133 P.2d 58. 593
(Mont. 1943).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-107(a) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-106(a) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-106(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-105 (1977).
Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County v. General Securities Corp..
138 P.2d 479. 487-488 (Kan.1943).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-106(b) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-104(b) (1977).
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rescission of the rule, based on his belief in its unconstitutionality, violation of legislative intent, or procedural error,

there is little left for the courts to decide. Since regulations
have the force and effect of law,7" it is difficult to justify the
governor's pronouncement of a regulation's demise, absent a
vote by the legislature to that effect, or a judicial determination of the issue.
One constitutionally viable interpretation of this problem may be that in Section 106(b), the legislature has merely delegated directly to the governor part of the rulemaking
authority once exercised by each individual agency. Administrative agencies may, without a doubt, repeal or amend
regulations they have adopted. 6 Under this section of the
ARRA, the agencies can be seen as sharing this function
with the governor. An additional problem arises, however, in
that not even the governor should be exempt from the procedural rulemaking requirements established by the APA.
Section 103 of that Act, for example, provides specific notice
and hearing procedures to be followed whenever an agency
adopts, amends, or repeals a rule.7 7 If the amendment or
repeal is mandated by the governor's order, these notice and
hearing safeguards are destroyed. Unfortunately, the ARRA
does not incorporate these APA provisions, leaving major
questions as to the proper process for amendment or rescission. Further, there is a limit to what courts will read into a
statute, even to meet the constructionary rule of presumed

constitutionality. 78
The Legislative Order and the Veto Power
Section 107(b) and (c) of the ARRA provide that the
legislature, each house voting separately, exercises its oversight function in the form of a legislative order. This provision raises two interrelated constitutional issues:
1. Is a legislative order the proper form for this
particular legislative action?
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Bronson v. Moonen, 528 P.2d 82. 85-86 Or. 1974: 2 AM. Jus.2dAdministrativeLaw
§ 295 (1962).
Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System. 536 P.2d 793, 806 (Alas. 1975).
WYo. STAT. § 9-4-103 (1977). This section applies to all rules except interpretive rules
or statements of general policy.
Barber v. State Highway Comm., 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 725 (Wyo. 1959).
WYo. STAT. § 28-9-107(b) and (c) (1977).
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Is such an order subject to presentment and
veto by the governor?

1. Legislative Order
It is well settled that an order or resolution is not the
same as a law.8 ° Resolutions and orders deal with matters of
special or temporary character; laws prescribe some permanent rule of conduct or government." It is necessary to look
beyond the title of the enactment, as something is not an
order or resolution just because that is what it was called."2
When acting by resolution or order, a legislature cannot go
outside of matters incident to its session and legislate
8 3
generally on matters involving property or other rights.
Where actual legislation by concurrent resolution is valid, it
is generally based on a specific constitutional
authorization."'
Administrative regulations are generally regarded as
legislative enactments, having the force and effect of law,
just as if they were enacted by the legislature as part of the
original statute.85 Further, any act which amends or repeals
an enactment which has the force and effect of law should be
of equal dignity.8 6 Yet, despite these apparently firm rules of
"housekeeping",
law, legislative bodies often go beyond just
7
resolutions.
and
orders
and legislate via
When an administrative agency makes or repeals a rule,
it does so based on the judgment and technical expertise of
its staff, which is the basis of the administrative process. If
repeal is accomplished other than by the agency, this expertise element is lost. In such cases, at least the one safeguard
of full legislative participation should be observed. Consequently, the practice of disapproving agency rules and
regulations by mere legislative order, though perhaps not
unconstitutional, seems questionable, at best.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Julian v. Mayor. Councilmen and Citizens of the City of Liberty. 391 S.W.2d 864.
867 (Mo. 1965): 43 Ops. Arry. GEN. 350. 357-360 (Wisc. 1954); Van Hovenberg v.
Holeman, 144 S.W.2d 718. 721 (Ark. 1940).
Baker v. City of Milwaukee. 533 P.2d 772. 777-778 (Or. 1975); State v. Atterbury.
300 S.W.2d 806, 817 (Mo. 1957).
Baker, supra note 81.
Rowley v. City of Medford. 285 P. 1111. 1114 (Or. 1930).
Ward v. State. 176 Okla. 368. 56 P.2d 136 (1936).
Bronson. supra note 75.
Chicago & N.P.R. Co. v. City of Chicago. 174 Ill. 439, 51 N.E. 596. 598 (1898).
Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, for instance. Congress
can disapprove of proposed public land sales by passing a concurrent resolution to
that effect. 43 U.S.C. § 1713(c) (1976).
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The legislative order provisions of Section 107(c) were
drafted to avoid Wyoming's constitutional mandate that
during the budget session no bills except the budget bill may
be introduced unless supported by a two-thirds majority of
either house.8 8 This rather artless justification for ignoring
the constitutionally required bill format was one of the major reasons prompting Governor Herschler to object to the
ARRA.89 There is no doubt that a strict constructionist
court could find this provision highly objectionable.
2.

Governor's Veto

One of the most pressing difficulties with the ARRA is
its failure to provide for a final gubernatorial veto of the
legislative orders passed in review of administrative rules.
Section 107 allows the legislature to disapprove, by
legislative order, the implementation or enforcement of any
rule." Nothing is said in the Act about the presentment of
such orders to the governor. This deficiency is constitutionally suspect under either of two analyses. First, if the
repeal or amendment of an administrative regulation by the
legislature is "lawmaking", then the Wyoming Constitution
demands that such "law" be in bill format, 9 ' and that it be
presented to the governor for approval or veto.9" And second, even rejecting this approach, there is clear constitutional language demanding presentment to the governor:
Every order, resolution or vote, in which the
concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or relating
solely to the transaction of the business of the two
houses, shall be presented to the governor, and
before it shall take effect be approved by him or,
being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds of
both houses as prescribed in the case of a bill. 3
Section 107 of the ARRA provides for the legislative
orders involved to be passed by the legislature, thus requir88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

WYO. CONST. art III. § 6. Gerald W. Fox. an LSO research assistant who helped
draft the ARRA. reports that the budget session "problem" was the major reason
for the legislative order format. Personal interview. February 9. 1978.
Letter from Herschler to Northrup. supra note 59. at 1.
WYO. STAT. § 28-9-107 (1977).
W'yo. CONST. art. 111. § 20.
"No law shall be passed except by bill ......
"Every bill which has passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law. be
presented to the governor." Wyo. CONST. art. IV. § 8. See also. State ex rel. Henderson v. Burdick. supra note 38. at 126.
WYO. CoNST. art. III, § 41.
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ing the concurrence of both houses.9 4 Because this is spelled
out in the Act, this is not a question of whether the "nature"
of the order necessitates a concurrent vote.9" Further, the
question is not adjournment or the business of the two
houses, so the excepting phrases do not apply.
The courts and commentators generally agree that the
legislative branch cannot avoid the executive veto power
simply by restyling legislative acts.9 In finding Wisconsin's
legislative oversight statute invalid, that state's attorney
general relied heavily on that theory. 7 Not everyone agrees,
though, as proponents of the legislative veto contend for a
less literal interpretation of these constitutional provisions.
One common argument against the necessity of a final
gubernatorial veto opportunity in statutes similar to Wyoming's ARRA, is that the governor already had a chance to
veto the ARRA itself, and by failing to do so, he forfeited his
objections. 9 On the other hand, acceptance of such a view
would bind not only that governor, but also his successors,
to the-detriment of the office. 100
There is presently little or no agreement among Wyoming's state officials as to the governor's authority to
review legislative orders under the ARRA. In his initial opinion concerning the Act, the attorney general construed the
relevant language of Section 107 as implying the veto. 101 The
legislature evidently assumes that the veto is not provided
for by the Act itself, because the 1978 budget session felt it
necessary to agree by a joint rule to send any legislative
orders approving Council recommendations to prohibit rule
enforcement to the governor.' 0 2 Despite his displeasure with
the Act's provisions, the governor allowed it to become law
94.

97.
98.

WYo. STAT. § 28-9-107 (1977).
In 1897. the United States Senate interpreted the similar federal constitutional provision as meaning that, in cases where the concurrent vote requirement was not certain. "necessary" refers to constitutional necessity. which turns upon whether the
vote in question is legislative in nature. S. REP. No. 1335. 54th CONG.. 2d SESS.. 8
(1897). See. Watson. at 1066.
Atkins v. United States. supra note 31 at 1065 Ginnane. at 593. Watson. at
1066-1067.
43 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 350 (Wise. 1954).
SCHWARTZ. ADMINISTRATI V LAW. supra note 41. Cooper & Cooper. at 478-479.

99.

Buckley v. Valeo. supra note 31. at 286. J. White, concurring Cooper & Cooper. at

95.

96.

477-478.

100.

Watson, at 1067.

101.
102.

Letter. supra note 54. at 5.
Senate Action Sheet. February 14. 1978. referring to HSR12-1S2/A (Rule 12-1).
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without his signature, 103 then less than a year later, he
changed his mind and notified the legislature that he had
decided the ARRA was unconstitutional. 104
CONCLUSION

Wyoming's Administrative Regulation Review Act
needs legislative re-evaluation. The ARRA provides for too
much review by too many people. Further, poor drafting has
left many of the Act's provisions unclear. These deficiencies,
especially when coupled with the problems of questionable
constitutionality, require remedial attention.
There are numerous examples of the procedural difficulties and internal inconsistencies of the ARRA. Section
103(b), for instance, provides that "drafts of proposed rules"
be sent to LSO for review, 0 5 while Section 104(c)(ii) instructs
whether the rule has been properly
LSO to determine
"adopted".1 6 For LSO to meet this latter requirement, the
agency obviously must file a copy of the rule with LSO
subsequent to its adoption, yet this is not specifically required by the Act.
Another shortcoming of the ARRA is that it provides
no consequences for a failure of LSO, the Council, or the
governor to meet their respective time limitations. Similarly,
the Act fails to spell out the responsibility of the agency
when the Council recommends, or the governor orders,
amendment or rescission of a rule. Also unclear is whether a
rule is free from potential review under the Act once the
Council has failed to recommend against it, or the legislature
has failed to disapprove it.
Beyond these procedural questions, the ARRA also has
broader conceptual problems. Though designed to give the
legislature more direct control over the rulemaking process,
the ARRA has actually given the most powerful review
authority to the governor. While LSO and the Council may
recommend against rules, and the legislature may disap104.

Letter from Ed Herschler. Governor of Wyoming, to Thyra Thomson. Secretary of
State. (March 15, 1977).
Letter. supra note 59.

105.

WYO. STAT.

106.

WYO.

103.

STAT.

§ 28-9-103(bl (1977).
§ 28-9-104(c6ii} (1977).
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prove rules subject to the governor's veto, the governor may
kill proposed rules by refusing to sign them, he may order
their amendment or rescission, and he may veto the
legislature's disapproval of a rule.
Rather than creating a systematic legislative oversight
scheme, the Wyoming State Legislature has given birth to a
hydra-headed monster. The superstructure of the ARRA
review process is far too cumbersome, destroying the essential purpose of the administrative process, which is the combination of efficiency and expertise. Individual legislators,
legislative committees, LSO, the Management Council, the
legislature, and the governor-all may meddle with administrative regulations to one degree or another. It is not
difficult to conclude that, even if the ARRA can avoid the
constitutional obstacles inherent in its design, the
legislature might be well advised to restructure the Act so
that it more nearly accomplishes realistic legislative review
of the administrative agencies.
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